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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Understanding and preventing fire hazards is necessary when designing, maintaining, and operating 
oxygen systems.  Ignition risks can be minimized by controlling heat sources and using materials that will 
not ignite or will not support burning in the end-use environment.  Because certain materials are more 
susceptible to ignition in oxygen-enriched environments, a compatibility assessment should be performed 
before the component is introduced into an oxygen system. This document provides an overview of 
oxygen fire hazards and procedures that are consistent with the latest versions of American Society for 
Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standards G63 (1999) and G94 (2005) to address fire hazards associated 
with oxygen systems.  This document supersedes the previous edition, NASA Technical Memorandum 
104823, Guide for Oxygen Hazards Analyses on Components and Systems (1996). The step-by-step 
oxygen compatibility assessment method described herein (see Section 4) enables oxygen-system 
designers, system engineers, and facility managers to determine areas of concern with respect to oxygen 
compatibility and, ultimately, prevent damage to a system or injury to personnel. 
 
2.0 REQUIREMENT 
An oxygen compatibility assessment as required by NASA-STD-6001 and NASA-STD-6016 shall be 
performed on each component per the procedure described in Section 4 of this document.   
 
3.0 OVERVIEW OF OXYGEN SYSTEM FIRE HAZARDS 
Fires occur in oxygen systems when oxygen, fuel, and heat, combine to create a self-sustaining chemical 
reaction (Figure 1).  Although oxygen, fuel, and ignition source are present in almost all oxygen systems, 
fire hazards can be mitigated by limiting the propensity for a chemical reaction to occur.  Controlling the 
risk factors associated with the oxygen, fuel, or heat in turn, will prevent the chemical reaction.   
 
3.1 Oxygen 
 
Oxygen pressure and concentration have significant effects on the flammability and ignitability of 
materials.  In general, materials are easier to ignite and burn more readily as oxygen pressure or 
concentration increase.  Hence, oxygen systems should be operated at the lowest possible pressure and 
oxygen concentration.  Limiting either the oxygen pressure or concentration may be sufficient to ensure 
that ignition and burning do not occur.   
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Fire Triangle 
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3.2 Fuel 
 
Fuel sources can be reduced by appropriate materials selection.  Some materials are more difficult to 
ignite than others. Additionally, some materials when ignited are more resistant to sustained burning than 
others.  Materials also vary in the amount of energy they release when they burn.  Selecting ignition and 
burn-resistant materials can, in some cases, eliminate the possibility of a fire occurring or reduce the 
damage caused by a fire. 
 
3.3 Ignition Source 
 
Despite the fact that heat sources are inherent in the operation of an oxygen system, the ability to initiate 
the chemical reaction between the system materials and oxygen can be limited by controlling or 
eliminating the ability of those heat sources to cause ignition.  Carefully selected design features can limit 
or dissipate the heat generated within an oxygen system.  If the temperatures generated by the ignition 
sources within the system or introduced into the system from external heat sources are below the ignition 
temperatures of the system materials, ignition cannot occur.  The oxygen system shall also be protected 
from external heat sources. 
 
 
4.0 OXYGEN COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 
The oxygen compatibility assessment process provides a systematic approach for identifying and 
addressing the fire hazards in an oxygen system.  The primary goal of the oxygen compatibility 
assessment process is to reduce the likelihood of a fire occurring in an oxygen system or component.  The 
necessity for conducting an oxygen compatibility assessment is directly tied to minimizing the risk of fire 
and the potential effects of a fire on personnel and system.  The oxygen compatibility assessment process 
may be used as either a design guide or as an approval process for components and systems.  The 
required oxygen compatibility assessment procedure is: 
 
1. Determine the worst-case operating conditions 
2. Assess the flammability of system materials 
3. Evaluate the presence and probability of ignition mechanisms 
4. Determine the kindling chain, which is the potential for a fire to breach the system 
5. Analyze the reaction effect, which is the potential loss of life, mission, and system 
functionality as the result of a fire 
6. Identify the history of use 
7. Report the results of the analysis 
 
4.1 Determine the Worst-case Operating Conditions 
 
The worst-case operating environment shall be determined to facilitate the evaluation of the ignition 
and flammability risks for a component or system.  Increased oxygen concentration, temperatures, 
pressures, flow rates, and contamination can intensify flammability and ignition risks.  Therefore, 
quantifying each of these conditions is a prerequisite of analyzing a system or component.  The analyst 
shall consult the responsible Materials and Processes organization to verify the worst-case 
operating environment.  Reliance on procedural controls to regulate the conditions within the oxygen 
systems should be minimized.  A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis may be used to determine the 
worst-case operating conditions.  In addition, the analyst shall determine the worst-case cleanliness 
level of each component.    
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4.2 Assess the Material Flammability 
 
The flammability of the materials of construction shall be determined.  The configuration of a system 
or component significantly influences the ignitability and flammability of the materials of construction.  
For instance, metals, including those that normally exhibit high resistance to ignition, are more flammable 
in oxygen when they have thin cross-sections (e.g., thin-walled tubing) or when they are finely divided 
(e.g., wire mesh or sintered filters).  Therefore when assessing flammability, a system flow schematic 
and a cross-sectional diagram (e.g., machined cut-away) of each component that shows the 
configuration and materials of construction (Figure 2) shall be used.  The flow schematic of the 
system and cross-sectional diagrams of each component shall be included in the report. 
 
With few exceptions, materials become more flammable in oxygen as pressures increase.  This includes 
metals, plastics, elastomers, lubricants, and contaminants.  In fact, nearly all polymer materials are 
flammable in 100 percent oxygen at atmospheric pressure.  Several test methods, such as promoted 
ignition and oxygen index, have been developed to determine the relative flammability of metals and 
nonmetals. The NASA Materials and Processes Technical Information System and latest versions of 
ASTM Manual 36 (2000), Standard G63 (1999), and Standard G94 (2005) provide test data for 
determining material flammability.   
 
The designer of an oxygen system or component shall consult the appropriate Materials and 
Processes organization to ensure that the testing data used to make flammability assessments are 
applicable to the specific design configuration.  Unfortunately, material flammability is affected by 
many factors and, therefore, absolute flammability thresholds are difficult to establish without testing the 
actual use configuration.  As such, much of the oxygen compatibility assessment process focuses on the 
presence and probability of ignition mechanisms (see Section 4.3). 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Example of Cross-sectional Diagram of a Component 
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4.3 Evaluate the Presence and Probability of Ignition Mechanisms 
 
The presence and relative probability of ignition mechanisms shall be determined.  An ignition 
mechanism is simply a source of heat that under the right conditions can lead to ignition of the materials 
of construction or contaminants in a system.  The most effective way to analyze the ignition risks in a 
system is to methodically analyze the system for known ignition mechanisms (Table 1). The designer of 
an oxygen system or component shall consult the appropriate Materials and Processes organization 
to ensure that the testing data used to make ignitability assessments are applicable to the specific 
design configuration.   
 
For ignition mechanisms to be effective, certain elements must be present.  These characteristic elements 
are unique for each ignition mechanism, and each element is necessary for an ignition to occur.  If any 
characteristic element is not present, the ignition mechanism is unlikely to occur.  Conversely, if all the 
characteristic elements are present, ignition is possible.  Ignition mechanisms are rated using the ignition 
mechanism rating logic in Table 2.  This logic takes into consideration both the presence of a 
mechanism’s characteristic elements and flammability of materials as discussed in section 4.2.  If the 
flammability of a material is unknown, or the materials of construction have not been selected, then the 
material should be considered flammable for the purposes of assessing the ignition mechanisms.   
 
 
Table 1 
Ignition Mechanisms 
Particle Impact Lightning 
Rapid Pressurization Explosive Charges 
Flow Friction a   Personnel Smoking and Open Flames 
Resonance Fragments from Bursting Vessels 
Mechanical Impact Welding 
Galling and Friction Engine Exhaust 
Fresh Metal exposure Static Discharge 
Electrical Arc Chemical Reaction 
Thermal Runaway  
a
  Theoretical only:  No current test method exists to duplicate flow friction in the laboratory. 
 
 
Table 2 
Ignition Mechanism Rating Logic 
Criteria Ignition Rating Code 
Characteristic Elements Material Flammability 
Not Possible 0 Not all present Nonflammable 
Remotely Possible 1 All present or 
Not all present 
Nonflammable 
Flammable 
Possible 2 All present and active Flammable 
Probable 3 All present and some are strongly 
active 
Flammable 
Highly Probable 4 All are present and all are 
strongly active 
Flammable 
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4.3.1 Ignition Mechanisms 
 
Particle Impact — Heat generated when small particles strike a material with sufficient velocity to ignite 
the particle and/or the material.   
 
Particle impact is a very effective ignition mechanism for metals, but less likely to ignite nonmetals 
unless they are very hard.  The characteristic elements necessary for ignition by particle impact are:  
 
• particles that can be entrained in the flowing oxygen;  
• gas velocities, typically greater than approximately 30 m/s (100 ft/s) (ASTM STP 986); and 
• an impact point ranging from 45 degrees to perpendicular to the path of the particle.a,b  
 
Test data show that, in most cases, the particulate must be flammable to produce ignition of the target 
material.  However, some highly reactive materials, such as aluminum and titanium, can be ignited when 
impacted by inert particles.   
 
Example:  Assembly-generated particles traveling at high velocities can cause particle impact ignition by 
striking the body just downstream of the control element of a valve (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3 
Particle Impact Ignition 
                                                     
a
  This was concluded from tests conducted using test fixtures that simulated the configuration of the Space Shuttle Type II Main 
Propulsion System oxygen flow control valve.  The Type II test fixtures were fabricated from Inconel 718 with drill points 
downstream the flow control orifice similar to the actual valve and with drill points removed.  The tests were performed at the 
same conditions and using the same particle mixture that ignited and burned the Type II oxygen flow control valve during 
certification testing.  The test conditions were as follows:  600 K oxygen temperature, 4600 psig oxygen pressure, and 10 mg 
of a particle mixture consisting of 26 percent Inconel 718, 29 percent 21-6-9 stainless steel, and 45 percent aluminum 2219 by 
weight.  The Type II Inconel 718 test fixture that contained the drill point ignited and burned on the second test.  The Type II 
Inconel 718 test fixture in which the drill points were removed resulting in an impact angle of 45 o did not ignite or burn when 
subjected to 40 tests.  [The Space Shuttle flow control valve was subsequently redesigned.] 
b
  Benz, F.  Summary of Testing on Metals and Alloys in Oxygen at the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) During the Last 
6 Months.  In RF/DLPippen:kp:09/14/88:5722, WSTF Metals Work Memo, from David Pippen to Director of Materials and 
Processes Laboratory at George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, September 15, 1988.   
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Data:  Particle impact data for metals and nonmetals are located in the latest versions of ASTM 
Manual 36 (2000) and Standard G94 (2005).  In general, copper and nickel-based alloys are resistant to 
ignition by particle impact.  Hard polymers have been ignited in particle impact tests, but limited data 
exist.  
 
Rapid Pressurization — Heat generated when a gas is rapidly compressed from a low pressure to a high 
pressure.  This ignition mechanism is also known as heat of compression or adiabatic compression.   
 
Rapid pressurization ignition is the most effective igniter of nonmetals, but does not ignite bulk metals.  
The characteristic elements for rapid pressurization ignition are: 
 
• rapid pressurization, generally occurring in less than 1 s;  
• an exposed nonmetal close to the rapidly pressurized dead-end; and  
• a pressure ratio that causes the maximum temperature from compression to exceed the situational 
auto-ignition temperature of the nonmetal.  
 
The maximum theoretical temperature from compression can be calculated using the following equation: 
 
n
n
i
f
i
f
P
P
T
T
)1( −
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
=  
Where:  
Tf = final temperature (absolute),  
Ti = initial temperature (absolute), 
Pf = final pressure (absolute), 
Pi = initial pressure (absolute), 
N = ratio of specific heats (1.4 for oxygen). 
 
The actual maximum temperature is inevitably appreciably lower than the maximum theoretical 
temperature. 
 
Example:  Fast-opening valve that releases high-pressure oxygen into a dead-end tube or pipe compresses 
the oxygen initially in the tube and causes rapid pressurization heating at the dead end (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Rapid Pressurization Ignition 
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Data:  Auto-ignition temperature data for nonmetals are found in the latest versions of ASTM Manual 36 
(2000) and Standard G63 (1999).  Extensive testing in a system consistent with ASTM G74 has 
demonstrated that for initial upstream pressures less than 275 psia and an initial downstream pressure of 
ambient or above, the actual temperature rise (with real heat loss) is too small for ignition to occur.  
 
Flow Friction — Heat generated when oxygen flows across a polymer and produces erosion, friction, 
and/or vibration.  Flow friction is a theoretical ignition mechanism, but current theory suggests that the 
characteristic elements for flow friction ignition include:  
 
• nonmetal exposed to flow; and 
• flow that produces a vibration in the nonmetal. 
 
Note: Surfaces of nonmetals that are highly fibrous from being chafed, abraded, eroded, or plastically 
deformed may render flow friction heating affects more severe.   
 
Examples: A leak past a polymer seal may cause flow friction ignition.  This could occur when throttling 
flow through an oxygen cylinder valve with a nonmetal seat that has been damaged due to extensive 
cycling. 
 
Note:  Although this ignition mechanism is poorly understood, it has caused a significant number of real-
life fires. 
 
Resonance — Acoustic oscillations within resonant cavities that cause rapid temperature rise.  The 
characteristic elements for resonance ignition include: 
 
• a favorable system geometry, which includes a throttling device (e.g., nozzle, orifice, regulator, or 
valve) directing a sonic gas jet into a cavity or closed-end tube (Figure 5);  
• acoustic resonance (often audible) and  
• flammable materials in the area of the resonance.  
 
The distance between the throttling device and the closed end affects the frequency of acoustic 
oscillations in the cavity due to the interference of incident and reflecting sound waves.  The distance also 
affects the temperature produced in the cavity.  Higher harmonic frequencies have been shown to produce 
higher system temperatures.  The resonant frequency has been shown to be a function of pipe diameter 
and pressure ratio (f (D, P/Pa)).  
 
Flammable materials residing at or near the closed end of the cavity can self-ignite due to the high gas 
temperatures produced by resonance heating.  Alternatively particulate or debris can vibrate, causing 
collisions that generate sufficient heat to self-ignite.   
 
Examples:  A capped tee fitting downstream of a valve or orifice, similar to Figure 5, can lead to 
resonance ignition.  Resonance is also used as an igniter for solid or liquid rocket fuel: gaseous oxygen 
flows through a sonic nozzle and directly into a resonance cavity, heating the gas and solid or liquid fuel.  
When the gas reaches the auto-ignition temperature of the fuel, ignition occurs and a flame jet is emitted 
from the chamber. 
 
Mechanical Impact — Heat generated due to single or repeated impacts on a material with sufficient 
energy to ignite it.  Most metals cannot be ignited by mechanical impact; however, nonmetals are 
susceptible to ignition by mechanical impact.  The characteristic elements for mechanical impact ignition 
are:  
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• a single, large impact or repeated impacts; and  
• a nonmetal or reactive metal at the point of impact.  
 
Some components, such as check valves, regulators and relief valves, may become unstable and “chatter” 
during use.  Chattering can result in multiple impacts in rapid succession on polymer poppets or seats 
within these components, creating a mechanical impact ignition hazard. The presence of liquid oxygen 
(instead of gaseous oxygen) may cause some porous materials to become dramatically more sensitive to 
mechanical impact. 
 
Example: A wrench dropping onto a porous hydrocarbon (e.g., asphalt) soaked with liquid oxygen could 
cause mechanical impact ignition (Figure 6). 
 
 
Particulate/debris 
Sonic nozzle/orifice 
Tee 
Valve closed 
Flow Flow 
Incident sound waves Reflective sound waves 
 
Figure 5 
Resonance Heating Ignition 
 
 
Figure 6 
Mechanical Impact Ignition 
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Data: Most metals are not susceptible to ignition by mechanical impact.  However, data has shown that 
aluminum, magnesium, titanium, and lithium-based alloys, as well as some lead-containing solders, can 
be ignited by mechanical impact.  Mechanical impact ignition data for nonmetals are found in the latest 
versions of ASTM Manual 36 (2000) and Standard G63 (1999). 
 
Galling and Friction — Heat generated by the rubbing of two or more parts together.  The characteristic 
elements for frictional ignition are: 
 
• two or more rubbing surfaces, generally metal-to-metal;  
• rapid relative motion; and 
• high loads pressing the rubbing parts together. 
 
Data from ASTM Manual 36 (2000) indicate that metals, not polymers, are most susceptible to ignition 
by friction in the frictional heating tests currently available.  Research indicates that polymers may also be 
susceptible to ignition in certain conditions.  Some components, such as check valves, regulators, and 
relief valves, may become unstable and “chatter” during use.  Chattering can result in rapid oscillation of 
the moving parts within these components, creating a frictional ignition hazard. 
 
Example:  Damaged or worn soft goods resulting in metal-to-metal rubbing between the piston and the 
cylinder of a reciprocating compressor (Figure 7) could lead to frictional ignition.  
 
Data:  Frictional heating data for various pairings of materials is located in the latest versions of 
ASTM Manual 36 (2000) and Standard G94 (2005). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
Friction Heating Ignition 
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Fresh Metal Exposure — the heat of oxidation released when unoxidized metal is exposed to an oxidizing 
atmosphere.   
 
This ignition mechanism usually acts in conjunction with other ignition mechanisms, such as frictional 
heating or particle impact, which damage metal surfaces.  This ignition mechanism may also be present 
with a fracture or tensile failure of an oxygen-wetted pressure vessel.  The characteristic elements for 
fresh metal exposure ignition are:  
 
• metal that oxidizes quickly and has a high heat of formation for its oxides, such as aluminum and 
titanium alloys;  
• destruction or rapid removal of oxide layer; and  
• configuration that minimizes heat loss.   
 
Static Discharge — Discharge of accumulated static charge with enough energy to ignite the material 
receiving the charge.  The characteristic elements for static discharge are:  
 
• static charge buildup from flow or rubbing accumulated on an electrically isolated surface; and 
• discharge point between materials, generally with differing electrical potentials.   
 
Generally, two charged surfaces are not as likely to arc unless one material is conductive.  Static 
discharge ignition is most likely to occur in dry gas environments. 
 
Examples:  Static charge accumulation due to dry oxygen flow through polymer hoses can lead to static 
discharge.  Bed sheets in hyperbaric chambers can be ignited by static discharge. 
 
Electrical Arc — Sufficient electrical current arcing from a power source with enough energy to ignite the 
material receiving the arc.  The characteristic elements necessary for ignition by electrical arc are:  
 
• an electrical power source; 
• an arc with sufficient energy to melt or vaporize materials; and 
• flammable material exposed to heating from the arc. 
 
Example:  A defective pressure switch could cause ignition when it arcs to a flammable material.  An 
insulated electrical heater element undergoing a short circuit could produce ignition by arcing through its 
sheath to a combustible material. 
 
Chemical Reaction — A reaction of a combination of chemicals that could release sufficient heat energy 
to ignite the surrounding materials.   
 
The characteristic elements for chemical reaction ignition depend on the reactants involved.  For example, 
some mixtures may be self-igniting while others need an external heat source.  In oxygen-hydrogen 
mixtures, the ignition energy is so low that it is assumed that energies released from mixing will ignite the 
mixture.  
 
Examples:  Oxygen reacting with the palladium getter in a vacuum-jacketed vessel produces ignition.  
Hydrogen leaking into the oxygen section of an oxygen-hydrogen fuel cell system can produce a chemical 
reaction ignition.  A heat-producing chemical reaction can occur when aluminum is sheared in the 
presence of polychlorotrifluoroethylene (PCTFE).  
 
Thermal Runaway — some materials, notably certain accumulations of fines, porous materials, or liquids, 
may undergo self-sustained reactions that generate heat.  
11 
 
If the rate of heating compared to the rate of dissipation is unfavorable, the material will increase in 
temperature.  In some cases, a thermal runaway may be attained and some time later the material may 
spontaneously ignite.  Ignition and fire may occur after short time periods (seconds or minutes) or over 
long time periods (hours, days, or months).  In the most extreme cases, the thermal runaway temperature 
may be near or below normal room temperature.  The characteristic elements for thermal runaway 
ignition include:  
 
• a material with a high surface-area-to-volume ratio (e.g., dusts, particles, foams, chars, etc.) that 
reacts exothermically (e.g., oxidation or decomposition) at temperatures significantly below its 
ignition temperature and  
• an environment that does not adequately dissipate heat (e.g., an insulated or large volume vessel 
or an accumulation of fines). 
 
Examples:  Ignition could occur due to an accumulation of small particulate generated by rubbing and 
abrasion in an oxygen compressor that has been proof-tested with nitrogen gas and is then exposed to 
oxygen.  Contaminated adsorbent or absorbent materials, such as molecular sieves (zeolites), alumina, 
and activated carbon, may become highly reactive in oxygen-enriched atmospheres. 
 
Other—Potential ignition sources to consider should initially include any external heat sources.  Many of 
the potential sources of heat are self-explanatory and include: lightning, explosive charges, personnel 
smoking and open flames, fragments from bursting vessels, welding, and exhaust from combustion 
engines. 
 
4.4 Determine the Kindling Chain 
 
The ability of a fire to propagate and burn through a component, i.e., the kindling chain, shall be 
evaluated.  Kindling chain begins when a material is ignited, and the material’s heat of combustion is 
sufficient to heat and ignite the surrounding materials leading to a burn-through of the component.  A 
burn-through is considered unlikely when the materials are nonflammable or an unfavorable ignition 
configuration is present.  A burn-through is considered likely when most materials (including the body) 
are flammable and a favorable ignition configuration is present.   
 
An example of a component with a possible kindling chain could be a manual valve with a polysulfone 
seat and a stainless steel stem and body.  In this configuration and at high pressures, the seat, stem and 
body are flammable.  If the polysulfone seat were ignited (e.g., by flow friction or rapid pressurization) 
enough energy could be released to ignite and burn the stem, which could then ignite the body and result 
in a burn-through of the manual valve.  The analyst should assess the kindling chain based on the 
presence of ignition mechanisms and the ability of the materials of construction to contain a fire.  If a 
component could be breached, a kindling chain is present. 
 
4.5 Analyze the Reaction Effect 
 
The reaction effect shall be determined.  The effects of a fire on personnel, mission, and system 
objectives are assessed by determining the reaction effect.  This value is primarily assigned based on the 
presence of a kindling chain and the potential consequences of a fire.  The potential consequences of a 
fire are based on the extent of fire propagation in the materials that surround the component.  A guide for 
rating the reaction effect for a system can be found in Table 3.  The example column in Table 3 
demonstrates how reaction effect ratings can be applied. 
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For example, a manually operated regulator constructed of nonflammable materials with a viable ignition 
mechanism and the absence of a kindling chain would be assigned “negligible.”  The same regulator with 
a kindling chain would be given a higher reaction effect rating of “catastrophic” because personnel could 
be injured or killed if the regulator failed.  Because it is difficult to conceive all possible fire scenarios 
resulting in injury, reaction effect ratings are often applied conservatively, which means the worst-case 
scenario drives the reaction effect assessment.   
 
4.6 Identify the History of Use 
 
The relevant history of use shall be evaluated.  The history of use is determined by whether the 
component has experienced routine operation/cycling in similar or more severe conditions over an 
extended period of time.  History of use is assigned a rating of either (+) successful, (-) negative, or (?) 
unknown.  For example, if a valve has been used in similar or more severe conditions over a period of 
time then the component may be given a (+) to indicate a successful history of use. 
 
4.7 Report the Results of the Analysis 
 
The results of the compatibility assessment shall be documented.  An oxygen compatibility 
assessment report can facilitate the communication and dissemination of the results to interested parties 
and record the findings for future reference.  The oxygen compatibility assessment report may also 
recommend changes to design, materials, and procedures in order to mitigate the fire hazards identified.   
 
Figures 8 and 9 provide an example of an oxygen compatibility assessment showing the complete 
analysis of a single component.  Complete and thorough information is extremely beneficial in 
communicating the findings of the assessment.  Whenever possible, references to the data used in 
determining the various ratings should be included.  Pictures, drawings, and schematics of the component 
should also be referenced and included in the final report. 
 
A system-level oxygen compatibility assessment should contain the compatibility assessment charts and 
drawings for each component in the system.  A system description and flow schematic should also be 
included in the final report.  A concise listing of the most severe hazards and suggested mitigations for 
those same hazards shall be included in the oxygen compatibility assessment report.   
 
Once prepared, the report should be reviewed by other analysts to obtain consensus.  Comments and 
feedback should be considered when finalizing the report.  After a final review, the report should be 
archived and transmitted to the customer.  
 
4.8 Hazard Control Table 
 
Each component should be listed in a table in order of decreasing reaction effect rating similar to Table 4.  
The table records the component, schematic reference, ignition hazard, initial ignition mechanism rating, 
reaction effect, recommendations to control that ignition mechanism, and the resulting ignition 
mechanism rating after the recommendation has been implemented.  Such a table is needed for displaying 
the hazards determined by the oxygen compatibility assessment as well as the current status of the 
recommendations. 
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Figure 8 
Oxygen Compatibility Assessment Example 
(Note:  Example only; data and ratings may not be accurate or current.) 
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Figure 9 
Oxygen Compatibility Assessment Example 
(Note: Example only; data and ratings may not be accurate or current.) 
 
 
Table 4 
Hazard Control Table 
Component Schematic Reference 
Ignition 
Hazard 
Probability 
Rating 
Reaction 
Effect Recommendation 
Mitigated 
Reaction Effect Status 
Manual 
Valve 
Dwg # Particle 
Impact 
4 D Change valve body 
from stainless steel 
to Monel. 
A  
0 = Not Possible 1 = Remotely Possible  2 = Possible 3 = Probable 4 = Highly Probable 
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